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authorRasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se>2021-04-26 19:54:06 +0200
committerRasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se>2021-04-26 19:54:06 +0200
commit87a2fa506c1861158ca04fd34d64e10b6447d8f3 (patch)
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parent83d38bfc5c3b9304953d04a4679658e3c2645367 (diff)
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@@ -28,5 +28,35 @@ System Transparency logging makes signed checksums transparent. The goal is to
_detect_ unwanted key-usage without making assumptions about the signed data.
## Threat model and (non-)goals
+We consider a powerful attacker that gained control of a target's signing and
+release infrastructure. This covers a weaker form of attacker that is able to
+sign data and distribute it to a subset of isolated users. For example, this is
+essentially what FBI requested from Apple in the San Bernardino case [\[FBI-Apple\]](https://www.eff.org/cases/apple-challenges-fbi-all-writs-act-order).
+The fact that signing keys and related infrastructure components get
+compromised should not be controversial [\[SolarWinds\]](https://www.zdnet.com/article/third-malware-strain-discovered-in-solarwinds-supply-chain-attack/).
+
+The attacker can also gain control of the transparency log's signing key and
+infrastructure. This covers a weaker form of attacker that is able to sign log
+data and distribute it to a subset of isolated users. For example, this could
+have been the case when a remote code execution was found for a Certificate
+Transparency Log [\[DigiCert\]](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/aKNbZuJzwfM).
+
+Any attacker that is able to position itself to control these components will
+likely be _risk-averse_. This is at minimum due to two factors. First,
+detection would result in a significant loss of capability that is by no means
+trivial to come by. Second, detection means that some part of the attacker's
+malicious behavior will be disclosed publicly.
+
+Our goal is to facilitate _detection_ of compromised signing keys. Therefore,
+we transparency log signed checksums. We assume that clients _fail closed_ if a
+checksum does not appear in a public log. We also assume that the attacker
+controls at most a threshold of independent parties to achieve our goal
+("strength in numbers").
+
+It is a non-goal to disclose the data that a signed checksum represents. For
+example, the log cannot distinguish between a checksum that represents a tax
+declaration, an ISO image, or a Debian package. This means that the type of
+detection we support is _courser-grained_ when compared to Certificate
+Transparency.
## Design