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Diffstat (limited to 'README.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 38 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 17 deletions
@@ -1,22 +1,26 @@ # System Transparency Front-End (STFE) +**Heads-up**: a refactor is happening in the `design` branch. The most +up-to-date design [motivation](https://github.com/system-transparency/stfe/blob/design/doc/design.md) +and [specification](https://github.com/system-transparency/stfe/blob/design/doc/api.md) +can be found there. + STFE is a [Trillian](https://transparency.dev/#trillian) [personality](https://github.com/google/trillian/blob/master/docs/Personalities.md) -that allows you to log signed checksums. What a checksum covers is up to the -submitter. For example, it could be a Firefox update, a Debian package, or a -document. A log leaf contains: -- A _checksum_ that covers something opaque, e.g., an executable binary. -- An _identifier_ that is tied to what the checksum represents, e.g., name, -version, and platform. -- A _signature_ that covers `checksum` and `identifier` using the submitter's -secret signing key. +that allows you to log signed checksums. What a checksum represents is up to +the submitter. For example, it could be a Firefox update, a Debian package, or +a document. A log leaf contains: +- A _checksum_ that represents a data item of opaque type. +- An _identifier_ that is tied to what the checksum represents. +- A _signature_ over `checksum` and `identifier` using the submitter's secret +signing key. - A _namespace_ that is tied to the submitter's verification key, e.g., think of it as a hashed public key. -The log verifies that the entry is signed for the specified namespace but -nothing more than that. A client that wishes to enforce transparency logging -could require that, say, a valid Debian package is only used if its checksum -appears in the log with a correct namespace and identifier. Such a use-case -scenario enables us to: +The log only verifies that an entry's checksum and identifier are +cryptographically signed based on the specified namespace. A client that wishes +to enforce transparency logging could require that, say, a valid Debian package +is only used if its checksum appears in the log with a correct namespace and +identifier. This allows us to: 1. **Facilitate detection of compromised signing keys**, e.g., a software publisher can inspect the log to see if there are any unexpected checksums in their own signing namespace(s). @@ -87,10 +91,10 @@ checksums. As far as we can tell the log's leaf entry must at minimum indicate: 2. What opaque data does the checksum _refer to_ such that the log entry can be analyzed by monitors. -Additional metadata needs can be included in the data that the checksum covers, -and the data itself can be stored in a public unauthenticated archive. Log APIs -and data formats should also follow the principle of minimal common denominator. -We are still in the process of analyzing this further. +Additional metadata needs can be included in the data that the checksum +represents, and the data itself can be stored in a public unauthenticated +archive. Log APIs and data formats should also follow the principle of minimal +common denominator. We are still in the process of analyzing this further. ### Spam and log poisoning Trillian personalities usually have an _admission criteria_ that determines who |