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Diffstat (limited to 'README.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 52 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 26 deletions
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ document. A log leaf contains: version, and platform. - A _signature_ that covers `checksum` and `identifier` using the submitter's secret signing key. -- A _namespace_ that is tied to the submitters verification key, e.g., think of +- A _namespace_ that is tied to the submitter's verification key, e.g., think of it as a hashed public key. The log verifies that the entry is signed for the specified namespace but @@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ scenario enables us to: publisher can inspect the log to see if there are any unexpected checksums in their own signing namespace(s). 2. **Ensure that everyone observe the same checksums**, e.g., there should never -be two log entries with identical identifiers and namespaces but with different -checksums. +be two log entries with identical namespaces and identifiers but checksums that +differ. -## What has been done? +## Current status STFE is at the proof-of-concept stage. We have a [sketch](https://github.com/system-transparency/stfe/blob/main/doc/sketch.md) of the log's API, which basically defines data structures, data formats, and @@ -44,7 +44,10 @@ uptime, stability, etc. In the meantime you may get your hands dirty by running STFE locally. Rough documentation is available [here](https://github.com/system-transparency/stfe/blob/main/server/README.md). -## What was considered? +## Design considerations +The following is a non-exhaustive list of design considerations that we had in +mind while developing STFE. + ### Gossip-audit model Simply adding something into a transparency log is a great start that has merit on its own. But, to make the most of a transparency log we should keep the @@ -55,43 +58,40 @@ so-called _promises to log_ as in [Certificate Transparency](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962).<sup>[2](#footnote-2)</sup> 2. Clients should verify that the log is append-only. This requires consistency proof verification. -3. Clients should convince themselves that they see the same append-only log as -everyone else. This requires a well-defined gossip-audit model. +3. Clients should verify they see the _same_ append-only log as everyone else. +This requires a well-defined gossip-audit model. -That last point is often overlooked. While transparency logs are verifiable in +The third point is often overlooked. While transparency logs are verifiable in theory due to inclusion and consistency proofs, _it is paramount that the different parties interacting with the log see the same entries and cryptographic proofs_. Therefore, we built a proactive gossip-audit model directly into STFE: _witness cosigning_.<sup>[3](#footnote-3)</sup> The idea is that many independent witnesses _cosign_ the log's STH if and only if they see a consistent append-only log. If enough reputable parties run -witnesses that signed-off the same STH, you can by corollary be pretty sure that -you see the same log (and thus the same checksums) as everyone else. +witnesses that signed-off the same STH, you can be pretty sure that you see the +same log (and thus the same checksums) as everyone else. -Moreover, if you already rely on witness cosigning for security, all you need -from, say, a software publisher, is an artifact, a public verification key, a -cosigned STH, and an inclusion proof up to that STH. To clarify why that is -excellent: client-side verification becomes completely non-interactive! +Moreover, if you rely on witness cosigning for security, all you need from, say, +a software publisher, is an artifact, a public verification key, a cosigned STH, +and an inclusion proof up to that STH. To clarify why that is excellent: +client-side verification becomes completely non-interactive! ### Ecosystem robustness -Our long-term aspiration is that clients should _fail-close_ if a checksum is +Our long-term aspiration is that clients should _fail-closed_ if a checksum is not transparency logged. This requires a _robust log ecosystem_. As more parties get involved by operating compatible logs and witnesses, the overall reliability and availability improves for everyone. An important factor to consider is therefore the _minimal common denominator_ to transparency log -checksums. - -STFE uses a leaf type that contains just enough information to establish a -context for clients and monitors: -1. What entity should the checksum be attributed to (follows from signature and -namespace). -2. What does the checksum refer to so that the data can be located (identifier). +checksums. As far as we can tell the log's leaf entry must at minimum indicate: +1. What public key should the checksum be attributed to. +2. What opaque data does the checksum _refer to_ such that the log entry can be +analyzed by monitors. Additional metadata needs can be included in the data that the checksum covers, -and the data itself can be stored in a public unauthenticated archive. It would -be more difficult to build compatible logs if everyone wanted their own leaf -type. Similarly, log APIs and data formats should ideally suit all. We are -still thinking about that. +and the data itself can be stored in a public unauthenticated archive. + +Log APIs and data formats should also follow the principle of minimal common +denominator. We are still in the process of analyzing this further. ### Spam mitigations Important factors: leaf is small, leaf is signed. |