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# System Transparency Log
This document provides a sketch of System Transparency (ST) logging. The basic
idea is to insert hashes of system artifacts into a public, append-only, and
tamper-evident transparency log, such that any enforcing client can be sure that
they see the same system artifacts as everyone else. A system artifact could
be an operating system image, a Debian package, or generally just a checksum of
something opaque.
An ST log can be implemented on-top of
[Trillian](https://trillian.transparency.dev) using a custom STFE personality.
For reference you may look at Certificate Transparency (CT) logging and
[CTFE](https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go/tree/master/trillian/ctfe),
which implements [RFC 6962](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962).
We reuse RFC 6962 and its follow-up specification [RFC
6962/bis](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis/) to the
largest extent possible.
## Log parameters
A log is defined by the following immutable parameters:
- Log identifier: a unique identifier
- Public key: a unique public key
- Base URL: where can this log be reached? E.g., example.com:1234/log
- Hash algorithm: e.g., SHA-256
- Signature algorithm: e.g., ECDSA on a given curve.
Note that **there is no MMD**. The idea is to merge added entries as soon as
possible, and no client should trust that something is logged until an inclusion
proof can be provided that references a trustworthy STH.
## Minimum acceptance criteria
A log should accept a submission if it is:
- Well-formed, see below.
- Digitally signed
- Proves who submitted an entry for logging
- The signing key must chain back to a valid trust anchor
## Data structure definitions
We encode everything that is digitally signed as in [RFC
5246](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246). Therefore, we use the same
description language for our data structures. A definition of the log's Merkle
tree can be found in RFC 6962, see
[§2](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-2).
### Repurposing `TransItem` as `StItem`
A general-purpose `TransItem` is defined by RFC 6962/bis. Below we define our
own `TransItem`, but name it `STItem` to emphasize that they are not the same.
Some definitions are re-used and others are added.
```
enum {
reserved(0),
signed_tree_head_v1(1), // defined in RFC 6962/bis, §4.10
signed_debug_info_v1(2), // defined below, think "almost SCT"
consistency_proof_v1(3), // defined in RFC 6962/bis, §4.11
inclusion_proof_v1(4), // defined in RFC 6962/bis, §4.12
checksum_v1(5), // defined below, think "leaf data"
(65535)
} StFormat;
struct {
StFormat format;
select (format) {
case signed_tree_head_v1: SignedTreeHeadV1;
case signed_debug_info_v1: SignedDebugInfoV1;
case consistency_proof_v1: ConsistencyProofV1;
case inclusion_proof_v1: InclusionProofV1;
case checksum_v1: ChecksumV1;
} message;
} StItem;
```
An `StItem` can be serialized into a list as described in RFC 6962/bis,
[§6.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-34#section-6.2).
### Merkle tree leaf types
In the future there might be several types of leaves. Say, one for operating
system packages, another one for Debian packages, and a third one for
general-purpose checksums. For now we only define the latter.
#### Checksum
A checksum entry contains a package identifier such as `foobar-1.2.3` and an
artifact hash that uses the log's configured hash function.
```
struct {
opaque package<0..2^8-1>; // package identifier
opaque checksum<32..2^8-1>; // artifact hash that used the log's hash func
} ChecksumV1;
```
For example, the checksum type could be used by Firefox to [enforce public
binary logging before accepting a new software
update](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency). It is assumed
that the entities relying on the checksum type know how to find the artifact
source (if not already at hand) and then reproduce the logged hash from it.
### Signed Debug Info
RFC 6962 uses Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) as promises of public
logging within a time known as the Maximum Merge Delay (MMD). We provide no
such promise: a Signed Debug Info (SDI) is an intent to log because the
submitter is authorized to do so and the entry appears to be valid. It will be
merged into the log's Merkle tree as soon as possible on a best-effort basis.
If an unexpected delay is encountered, the submitter can present the issued SDI
to the log operator (who can then investigate the underlying reason further).
```
struct {
LogID log_id; // defined in RFC 6962
opaque message<0..2^16-1> // debug string that is only meant for the log
opaque signature; // computed by the log over the StItem in question
} SignedDebugInfoV1;
```
## Public endpoints
Clients talk to the log with HTTPS GET/POST requests. POST parameters
are JSON objects, GET parameters are URL encoded, and serialized data is
expressed as base-64. See details in as in RFC 6962,
[§4](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-4).
Unless specified otherwise, the data in question is serialized.
### add-entry
```
POST https://<base url>/st/v1/add-entry
```
Input:
- item: an `StItem` that corresponds to a valid leaf type. Only
`checksum_v1` at this time.
- signature: a `DigitallySigned` object as defined in RFC 5246,
[§4.7](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-4.7), that covers this item.
- certificate: base-64 encoded X.509 certificate that is vouched for by a trust
anchor and which produced the above signature.
Output:
- sdi: an `StItem` structure of type `signed_debug_info_v1` that covers the
added item.
### get-entries
```
GET https://<base url>/st/v1/get-entries
```
Input:
- start: 0-based index of first entry to retrieve in decimal.
- end: 0-based index of last entry to retrieve in decimal.
Output:
- entries: an array of objects, each consisting of
- leaf: `StItem` that corresponds to the leaf's type.
- signature: `DigitallySigned` object that covers the retrieved item.
- chain: an array of base-64 encoded certificates, where the first
corresponds to the signing certificate and the final one a trust anchor.
The signature and chain can be viewed as a leaf's appendix, i.e., something that
is stored by the log but not part of the leaf itself.
### get-anchors
```
GET https://<base url>/st/v1/get-anchors
```
No input.
Output:
- certificates: an array of base-64 encoded trust anchors that the log accept.
### get-proof-by-hash
```
GET https://<base url>/st/v1/get-proof-by-hash
```
Input:
- hash: a base-64 encoded leaf hash.
- tree_size: the thee size that the proof should be based on in decimal.
The leaf hash value is computed as in RFC 6962/bis,
[§4.7](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-34#section-4.7).
Output:
- inclusion_proof: an `StItem` of type `inclusion_proof_v1`. Note that this
structure includes both the leaf index and an audit path for the tree size.
### get-consistency-proof
```
GET https://<base url>/st/v1/get-consistency-proof
```
Input:
- first: the `tree_size` of the older tree in decimal.
- second: the `tree_size` of the newer tree in decimal.
Output:
- consistency: an `StItem` of type `consistency_proof_v1` that corresponds to
the requested tree sizes.
### get-sth
```
GET https://<base url>/st/v1/get-sth
```
No input.
Output:
- sth: an `StItem` of type `signed_tree_head_v1`, which corresponds to the most
recently known STH, which corresponds to the most recently known STH.
|
