diff options
author | Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se> | 2021-10-02 00:04:03 +0200 |
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committer | Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se> | 2021-10-02 00:54:13 +0200 |
commit | 2f7f214e9df9c7e48d114ee233fb91b76d7e4294 (patch) | |
tree | a3e84d3f18203b480138168d09e0f3204760e283 /doc | |
parent | 5cacd6e36630b210a2c084f8709b1db811809ca6 (diff) |
updated abstract
- Avoid using sigsum as "signed checksum" in text. Not helpful.
- Promise less about use-case discussion. We are not there yet.
- Emphasize that we want feedback by having that on a separate line.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/design.md | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/doc/design.md b/doc/design.md index 87e95ca..7ef8a4e 100644 --- a/doc/design.md +++ b/doc/design.md @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ # Sigsum Logging Design v0 We propose sigsum logging. It is similar to Certificate Transparency, except -that cryptographically **sig**ned check**sum**s are logged instead of X.509 -certificates. Publicly logging sigsum statements allow anyone to discover which +that cryptographically **sig**ned check**sum**s are logged instead of TLS +certificates. Publicly logging signed checksums allow anyone to discover which keys produced what checksum signatures. For example, malicious and unintended -key-usage can be _detected_. We present our design and discuss a few use-cases -like binary transparency and reproducible builds. +key-usage can be _detected_. This document motivates and presents our design. **Preliminaries.** You have basic understanding of cryptographic primitives, e.g., digital @@ -13,8 +12,9 @@ Certificate Transparency solves and how. **Warning.** This is a work-in-progress document that may be moved or modified. A future -revision of this document will bump the version number to v1. Please let us -know if you have any feedback. +revision of this document will bump the version number to v1. + +Please let us know if you have any feedback. ## 1 - Introduction Transparent logs make it possible to detect unwanted events. For example, |