update source of www.sigsum.org

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+Sigsum logging brings transparency to signed checksums.  This makes it possible
+to detect malicious and unintended key-usage.  In other words, no signature
+accepted by an end-user goes unnoticed.
+
+> A new signature made with my key was just logged.
+> Was that signature expected?
+
+Specific use-cases can be implemented on-top of the minimal building block that
+Sigsum provides.  Examples include transparency for executable binaries, TPM
+quotes, and onion address rulesets.
+
+> Everyone gets the same binaries.
+> Signed binary checksums become public in Sigsum logs.
+> Each binary is locatable on a separate release page.
+> An independent monitor can verify these claims.
+
+Sigsum is designed to be secure against a powerful attacker that controls:
+
+  - The signer's secret key and infrastructure
+  - The log's secret key and infrastructure
+  - A threshold of so-called witnesses that cosign the log
+
+Any use-case that cannot tolerate a few minutes of logging latency is out of
+scope.  This and other aspects keep the Sigsum design simple, both with regards
+to operations and end-user verification.