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diff --git a/doc/design.md b/doc/design.md index 2e01a34..10b598f 100644 --- a/doc/design.md +++ b/doc/design.md @@ -1,13 +1,14 @@ -# System Transparency Logging: Design v0 -We propose System Transparency logging. It is similar to Certificate -Transparency, except that cryptographically signed checksums are logged as -opposed to X.509 certificates. Publicly logging signed checksums allow anyone -to discover which keys produced what signatures. As such, malicious and -unintended key-usage can be _detected_. We present our design and conclude by -providing two use-cases: binary transparency and reproducible builds. +# Sigsum Logging Design v0 +We propose sigsum logging. It is similar to Certificate Transparency, except +that cryptographically **sig**ned check**sum**s are logged instead of X.509 +certificates. Publicly logging _sigsums_ allow anyone to discover which +keys produced what checksum signatures. For example, malicious and unintended +key-usage can be _detected_. We present our design and discuss a few use-case +scenarios like binary transparency and reproducible builds. **Target audience.** -You are most likely interested in transparency logs or supply-chain security. +You are likely interested in transparent logs, public-key infrastructures, +or supply-chain security. **Preliminaries.** You have basic understanding of cryptographic primitives like digital @@ -24,8 +25,7 @@ Transparency logs make it possible to detect unwanted events. For example, are there any (mis-)issued TLS certificates [\[CT\]](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962), did you get a different Go module than everyone else [\[ChecksumDB\]](https://go.googlesource.com/proposal/+/master/design/25530-sumdb.md), or is someone running unexpected commands on your server [\[AuditLog\]](https://transparency.dev/application/reliably-log-all-actions-performed-on-your-servers/). -A System Transparency log makes signed checksums transparent. The overall goal -is to facilitate detection of unwanted key-usage. +A sigsum log brings transparency to **sig**ned check**sum**s. ## Threat model and (non-)goals We consider a powerful attacker that gained control of a target's signing and @@ -47,17 +47,22 @@ detection would result in a significant loss of capability that is by no means trivial to come by. Second, detection means that some part of the attacker's malicious behavior will be disclosed publicly. -Our goal is to facilitate _detection_ of compromised signing keys. We consider -a signing key compromised if an end-user accepts an unwanted signature as valid. -The solution that we propose is that signed checksums are transparency logged. +Our goal is to facilitate _disocvery_ of signed checksums. Such discovery +makes it possible to detect attacks on signing and release infrastructures. For +example, the signer can detect an unwanted sigsum by inspecting the log. + +It is a non-goal to disclose the data that a cryptographic checksum represents +_in the log_. A log cannot distinguish between a checksum that represents a tax +declaration, an ISO image, or a Debian package. The type of detection that we +support is therefore more _coarse-grained_ when compared to Certificate +Transparency. A significant benefit is that the resulting design becomes +simpler, generally useful, and less costly to bootstrap into a reliable +operation. + For security we need a collision resistant hash function and an unforgeable signature scheme. We also assume that at most a threshold of seemingly independent parties are adversarial. -It is a non-goal to disclose the data that a checksum represents. For example, -the log cannot distinguish between a checksum that represents a tax declaration, -an ISO image, or a Debian package. This means that the type of detection we -support is more _coarse-grained_ when compared to Certificate Transparency. ## Design We consider a data publisher that wants to digitally sign their data. The data |