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-rw-r--r--doc/claimant.md2
-rw-r--r--doc/design.md4
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/doc/claimant.md b/doc/claimant.md
index cfb6198..b11cd34 100644
--- a/doc/claimant.md
+++ b/doc/claimant.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ XXX: add more examples.
System<sup>RB</sup> is about the claims made by a _software publisher_ that
makes reproducible builds available.
* **Claim<sup>RB</sup>**:
- _I, software publisher, claim that the right opaque data_:
+ _I, software publisher, claim that the data_:
1. has cryptographic hash X
2. is the output of a reproducible build for which the source and relevant
build-info information can be located in repository Y using X as an identifier
diff --git a/doc/design.md b/doc/design.md
index 4746e55..fca64ea 100644
--- a/doc/design.md
+++ b/doc/design.md
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ The signing party is called a _signer_.
The user of the signed data is called a _verifier_.
The problem with _just digital signing_ is that it is difficult to determine
-whether the signed data is actually _the right data_.
+whether the signed data is _actually the data that should have been signed_.
How would we detect if a secret signing key got compromised?
How would we detect if something was signed by mistake, or even worse,
-if the signing party was forced to sign the wrong data against their will?
+if the signing party was forced to sign malicious data against their will?
Sigsum logs make it possible to answers these types of questions. The basic
idea is to make a signer's _key-usage_ transparent. This is a powerful building