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diff --git a/doc/design.md b/doc/design.md index f966d03..59cd7c8 100644 --- a/doc/design.md +++ b/doc/design.md @@ -28,5 +28,35 @@ System Transparency logging makes signed checksums transparent. The goal is to _detect_ unwanted key-usage without making assumptions about the signed data. ## Threat model and (non-)goals +We consider a powerful attacker that gained control of a target's signing and +release infrastructure. This covers a weaker form of attacker that is able to +sign data and distribute it to a subset of isolated users. For example, this is +essentially what FBI requested from Apple in the San Bernardino case [\[FBI-Apple\]](https://www.eff.org/cases/apple-challenges-fbi-all-writs-act-order). +The fact that signing keys and related infrastructure components get +compromised should not be controversial [\[SolarWinds\]](https://www.zdnet.com/article/third-malware-strain-discovered-in-solarwinds-supply-chain-attack/). + +The attacker can also gain control of the transparency log's signing key and +infrastructure. This covers a weaker form of attacker that is able to sign log +data and distribute it to a subset of isolated users. For example, this could +have been the case when a remote code execution was found for a Certificate +Transparency Log [\[DigiCert\]](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/aKNbZuJzwfM). + +Any attacker that is able to position itself to control these components will +likely be _risk-averse_. This is at minimum due to two factors. First, +detection would result in a significant loss of capability that is by no means +trivial to come by. Second, detection means that some part of the attacker's +malicious behavior will be disclosed publicly. + +Our goal is to facilitate _detection_ of compromised signing keys. Therefore, +we transparency log signed checksums. We assume that clients _fail closed_ if a +checksum does not appear in a public log. We also assume that the attacker +controls at most a threshold of independent parties to achieve our goal +("strength in numbers"). + +It is a non-goal to disclose the data that a signed checksum represents. For +example, the log cannot distinguish between a checksum that represents a tax +declaration, an ISO image, or a Debian package. This means that the type of +detection we support is _courser-grained_ when compared to Certificate +Transparency. ## Design |