diff options
| author | Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se> | 2021-10-07 18:39:59 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se> | 2021-10-07 18:39:59 +0200 |
| commit | 72a7c79e55120b05aef7a8b356ee273984c7f1ce (patch) | |
| tree | ab3f19d863e370e3632f29ce2df9cd1490328282 /doc/design.md | |
| parent | 238a4b1ac9ae2a91cef28e6d2df9ebd2fbb0e882 (diff) | |
removed unnecessary sentence in threat model
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/design.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/design.md | 7 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/design.md b/doc/design.md index b177f85..57bc919 100644 --- a/doc/design.md +++ b/doc/design.md @@ -130,10 +130,9 @@ Transparency Log [\[DigiCert\]](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/ct-policy/c/aKNbZuJzwfM). The overall system is said to be secure if a monitor can discover every signed -checksum that a verifier would accept, or alternatively, if log misbehavior can -be detected. A log can misbehave by not presenting the same append-only Merkle -tree to everyone. A log operator would only do that if it is likely to go -unnoticed. +checksum that a verifier would accept. A log can misbehave by not presenting +the same append-only Merkle tree to everyone because it is attacker-controlled. +However, a log operator would only do that if it is likely to go unnoticed. For security we need a collision resistant hash function and an unforgeable signature scheme. We also assume that at most a threshold of independent |