diff options
author | Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se> | 2021-10-10 20:01:22 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Rasmus Dahlberg <rasmus.dahlberg@kau.se> | 2021-10-10 20:08:14 +0200 |
commit | d1ea4e9a9940367cc5dfdaf0d9eab99d1a54eb8b (patch) | |
tree | c7a91b84918f024dad537b994772ab7131bca15a /doc | |
parent | ab7b2645e73bc0880960d8b1378bcc9a926acd1d (diff) |
emphasized "attacker" instead of "log operator"
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/design.md | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/design.md b/doc/design.md index 9030091..40287a4 100644 --- a/doc/design.md +++ b/doc/design.md @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ The overall system is said to be secure if a log monitor can discover every signed checksum that a verifier would accept. A log can misbehave by not presenting the same append-only Merkle tree to everyone because it is attacker-controlled. -However, a log operator would only do that if it is likely to go unnoticed. +The attacker would only do that if it is likely to go unnoticed, however. For security we need a collision resistant hash function and an unforgeable signature scheme. We also assume that at most a threshold of independent @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ attempts [split-view](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05) and [slow-down](https://git.sigsum.org/sigsum/tree/archive/2021-08-24-checkpoint-timestamp) -attacks. A log operator can at best deny service with these assumptions. +attacks. An attacker can at best deny service with these assumptions. ## 3 - Design An overview of sigsum logging is shown in Figure 1. Before going into detail |