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diff --git a/archive/2021-09-28-design-comments b/archive/2021-09-28-design-comments new file mode 100644 index 0000000..42cebec --- /dev/null +++ b/archive/2021-09-28-design-comments @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +-design.md file: [rohonk] + + Line 39-49: This part is very important as it clearly states the goal of the project. Also it draws a comparison between our goal and what we want to achieve different/better than the previously available certificate transperancy. I would like to suggest if we can make a different subsection 1.2, which deals with the comparative study. + + Line 60-62: Using Claimant Model. + + Line 88-89: Does it mean that the fingerprint i.e. (hash of the opaque data is already stored in the sigsum log)? And now the Claimant checks with the log. + + Figure 1: What happens if one of the participating party (Believer/Claimant) act maliciously by deviating from the protocol? + + Line 109-113: Introduction to DNS in order to avoid log poisoning is a very interesting concept. + + Line 141-158: Each of the different attack circumstances needs to be dealt with in the security proof. Here we are considering an external attacker as a threat. Is it a good question to ask that what happens when the trusted party act maliciously within the system? + + Line 183-185: This part partially address my concern stated in the previous point. + + Steps for Security Proof: + https://git.sigsum.org/sigsum/tree/archive/2021-06-21-system-overview-ascii + 1. Writing pseudocodes for each interaction i.e. Claimant <> Believer , + Claimant <> Witness. + 2. Have a threat model considering all possible misbehaviours. + 3. Cryptographic Schemes already determined (CRH, ECDSA) + 4. Decide on what kind of security proof is necessary like pen and paper proof or using software like Proverif/Tamarind? |