Q/A session rgdd-rohon
Q: how sigsum project different than ct from security / architecture point of view
* SCTS, promises of public logging
* Centrally trust the logs because it is difficult to audit in practise
* No SCTs, you need to fetch an inclusion proof that references a cosigned tree head
* Decentralized/distributed trust, assumption is an honest majority for witnesses
* A pretty opinionated gossip-audit model, much emphasis on simple and minimalistic
Q: why no cryptographic agility / what is the motivation?
* Don't let people use old bad choices like rsa, legacy tools, etc.
* Makes exchanged protocol messages simpler (e.g., no negotiation)
* Makes supporting sigsum protocol easier (you need one primitive, not many)
* If a primitive breaks -> roll up protocol version
Q: Elaborate about "the right data"?
* Suppose you downloaded Tor Browser
* Signature is valid
* Now what?
* You kind of have to trust that the signer signed the right data
* What if the signer was coereced to sign a back-doored version?
* What if the signing key was stolen? How would a signer even detect that?
* Sigsum logs add discoverability into signing operations
* Anyone can detect what has been signed by monitoring sigsum logs
* "Oh, there is this signature that doesn't correspond to any Tor Browser Bundle"
* "Tor Project, what is that? Please look into this issue and explain"
* This type of transparency is difficult without a log that adds discoverability
Q: What crypto primitives are supported
* Ed25519 (signify, minisign, etc.)
* (Remark: we are thinking about Ed25519ph and SHA512/256)
Q: At what part Rohon comes in?
* Model system formally, requires notation
* Think about how security proof goes (properties, assumptions, argument)
* Claimant model
* Sigstore (good to be aware of, does similar things with different trade-offs)